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1. Introduction 
General  Directorate  of  State  Theaters  (GDST)  is  one  of  the  most  important  and 
controversial institutions in Turkey since the beginning of its establishment.  It is one of the 
most  important  mission  institutions  to  establish  and  introduce  the  Western  culture  and 
lifestyle especially in Ankara first, which is the capital city of Turkey.  Toward the end of the 
second half of the 1940s,  the first  official stage of  State Theater was  opened in  Ankara.  
Today, the state produces live theater on twenty-eight stages in twelve different cities.    
The  main  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate  the  determinants  of  total  paid 
attendance and efficiency of live theater performances staged by the GDST in Turkey.   This 
paper also contributes to the literature of efficiency in public sector institutions in Turkey.  
Efficiency issues in service producing institutions of the public sector has been addressed in 
the popular press in Turkey, however, this is one of the very small number of formal studies 
investigating the issue.    
Productivity  and/or  efficiency  are  used  interchangeably  in  many  different  earlier 
contexts in economics.  Especially productivity as a concept has a special meaning in cultural 
economics since it was the key concept of Baumol and Bowen’s cost disease (1965).  It is 
claimed that productivity in the performing arts by their nature is difficult to increase since 
input structure is not changing to produce output (artistic production) over the years or with 
technological progress in other sectors.  This argument can be investigated from different 
perspectives; however, it is outside the scope of this paper.  What is more relevant to the 
current paper is the fact that productivity in performing arts as Baumol and Bowen(1965 and 
1966) understand, is a more aggregate concept than efficiency used in this paper.  In addition, 
in Baumol and Bowen (1965 and 1966), productivity is a longer term concept than efficiency 
in this paper.  In short, productivity in the performing arts as in its original use is more related 
to the performing arts sector in general, efficiency is more related to individual performing art 
companies or groups in terms of how efficiently they use their resources to reach their stated 
goals.  
It is observed, in practice, that productivity, efficiency, and performance of theaters 
are used interchangeably to evaluate how rationally theaters are using their resources (Theater 
Facts 2003 and 2004).  Theater resources can be fiscal resources like annual expenditure 
budgets or physical resources like number of actors or artists.   
Therefore, there are many ways of measuring efficiency according to the theatrical 
production view.  Theaters might be producing shows, performances, sold tickets, services of 
artistic  or  cultural  education,  prestige,  pleasure,  and  entertainment  to  name  some.  For 
instance,  Throsby  and  Withers  (1979)  give  their  preference  to  measure  the  output  as  the 
number of tickets actually sold.  Many studies use total paid attendance per performance, 
number  of  performance  or  attendance  per  capita  as  the  basic  measures  of  productivity 
(Theater Facts 2003 and 2004).  Serrano (2006) employs data envelopment analysis (DEA) to 
investigate the managerial efficiency of regional theaters of Spain.  These studies require a 
number of cross section units of individual theater companies or groups to compare their 
relative efficiency.  In addition, if the theater groups are different in their theatrical views or 
goals,  these  statistical  methods  will  not  be  desirable  to  investigate  their  efficiency.    For 
example, some theaters produce plays to create only prestige, while some others have the goal 
of increased number of audience, etc. 
However, in order to investigate the efficiency of Turkish State Theaters, we focus our 
attention  on  the  number  or  determination  of  performances  per  play.    The  number  of 
performances  per  play  itself  may  not  be  a  measure  of  efficiency  per  se.    However, 
determination of number of performances is taken here as a measure of efficiency.  This study 
is literally the second after Akdede and King (2006), in terms of using the determination of 
number of performance as a measure of efficiency.   Even though efficiency is studied in 
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Akdede and King (2006), the emphasis was on the estimation of demand for Turkish public 
theaters.  This paper, however, is especially investigating and emphasizing inefficiencies to 
see whether inefficiencies are just one season phenomena or they are lasting in more than one 
season. Akdede and King (2006) was using only 2002-2003 season data since only that data 
set was available by the time that study was conducted.  Now, data for 2003-2004 and 2004-
2005  seasons  are  available.    And  the  robustness  check  is  necessary  to  see  whether 
inefficiencies are lasting longer than one season or not.  
A play is considered to be performed too many times or too little if it is performed 
exogenously.  Therefore, both high and low number of performances would be efficient if 
they had a reason to be so.  Average number of performances in many theaters in the world is 
between fifteen and sixteen times per play for the second half of 1990s and beginning of the 
2000s (Corning and Levy, 2002).  They are, for the Turkish State Theaters, on average 29 and 
31  for  the  2003-2004  and  2004-2005  seasons  respectively
1.    This  may  be  a  sign  of 
inefficiency.  The determinants of performances can help us investigate some of the efficiency 
problems in State Theaters in Turkey.   
According to a personal interview, which is conducted by the author, with the Chair of 
the Dramaturgy Council of State Theaters in  Ankara, the chair claims that the number of 
performances of a play is determined by the attendance and central administrative decisions 
made in Ankara.  According to the Chair of the Dramaturgy Council, a particular play may be 
taken out of the repertoire if, for example, the actors, stage managers and directors cannot get 
along for some reason.   It is mentioned by the Chair of the Dramaturgy Council that it is 
sometimes observable that there are conflicting interests among actors, sta ge managers, and 
directors since most actors, directors, and managers also work outside of State Theaters like in 
TV, movie industry, TV series, and sitcoms.  The Chair states that from time to time there 
would be some scheduling conflicts along with some  other conflicts caused by artistic 
jealousy and disagreement.  Since every actor and staff member in the theater is a government 
official, it is very difficult to end their  employment.  It is so because they have lifetime job 
security.  The main goal, among many other minor goals, of state theaters in Turkey is to 
increase the number of theater attendance.  Therefore, combining the claims of the Chair of 
Dramaturgy  Council  and  stated  main  goal  of  state  theaters  (increasing  attendance), we 
investigate the  efficiency  of  state  theaters in  terms  of  determination  of  the number  of 
performances.   
The lack of auditioning for roles and lifetime job security can also be a source of 
personnel problems that affect the system’s efficiency.  It is also argued in the popular press 
and art circles that there is also corruption in state theaters in the sense that the work of some 
writers and directors runs longer than that of others or some writers are given favors in terms 
of including their plays in the repertoire
2.  In other words, there is no established rule for the 
number of performances of the plays in State Theaters.   In September 2005, the Director of 
General Directorate of State Theaters was fired by the Culture Minister of Turkey, and right 
before the 2005-2006 theater season, popular press questioned even the legitimacy of State 
Theaters in Turkey along with many other issues  related to the State Theaters.  For example, 
the  term  of  ATMactors  is  coined  (even  much  before  September  2005)  to  refer  to  actors 
working officially for the State Theaters, but taking no roles in State Theater plays.  Instead, 
they  are  in  the  film  business,  TV  sitcoms,  and  dubbings  of  foreign  movies.  Their  only 
relation with the State Theaters is to go to an ATM to get their monthly salaries and secured 
pension plans.   
                                                 
1 Own calculations.  Touring performances are taken out of calculations.  If they are included, the average 
numbers are even much bigger. 
2 Daily newspaper, Radikal June 25, 2006, addresses this issue.  
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Even  though  these  are  very  important  determinants  of  inefficiency,  they  are  also 
outside the scope of the paper.  Those reasons might be the causes rather than results of 
inefficiencies of the state theaters.  The unavailability of data restricts the detailed statistical 
analysis  of  inefficiencies  of  state  theaters.    However,  the  determination  of  number  of 
performances and exogeneity of performances are useful tools to analyze efficiency issues.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.    Next  section  lays  out  the  methodology  of 
estimating attendance and performance of plays  equation.  Section  III gives the data and 
results and last section concludes the paper.   
2. Methodology and previous work 
Although  the  economics  of  live  theater  and  performing  arts  and  attendance  to 
performing arts have been studied before (e.g., see Moore, 1968 and Throsby and Withers, 
1979), this study is, to our knowledge, the second of its nature for Turkey's case after Akdede 
and King (2006).  For a survey of recent work dealing with the attendance and demand for 
performing arts and live theater, see Borgonovi (2004), Corning and Levy (2002), Urrutiaguer 
(2002), Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) and Throsby (1990, 1994).  
This study, to our knowledge, is the second in terms of investigating the efficiency of 
theaters by using the total number of performances as the key determinant of efficiency.  Of 
course,  total  number  of  performances  is  a  key  element  of  determining  the  efficiency  of 
Turkish state theaters, not necessarily applicable all the theaters in every context.  However, it 
is useful to analyze whether market (audience attention) or central decision making is more 
efficient in terms of resource use.  
The literature about demand for and attendance to performing arts and theater is not 
reviewed here since it is reviewed in other papers such as Akdede and King (2006), Akdede ( 
2006), and Corning and Levy (2002). The structure of Turkish state theaters is also analyzed 
in Akdede and King (2006). 
First equation to be estimated here is the attendance equation.  Following Urrutiaguer 
(2002), the general model is as follows: 
) , , , ( D C S P f Y                                                                              (1) 
where Y is the number of paying attendees for a given performance, P is the price charged for 
the performance, S the number of performances, C is the venue capacity and D is a vector of 
dummy variables representing some available qualitative characteristics of the play.  In our 
case, Y represents the total paid attendance for the play during the given month and we must 
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Dividing the dependent variable by the number of performances also reduces the effects of 
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see how current ticket sales are affected by the longevity of the play.   
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Therefore,  eq.(2)  is  a  latent  variable  regression  model  and  right  censoring  is  taken  into 
account in the following way.   
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where ci is fixed censoring point and it is calculated as capacity minus free tickets distributed 
per performance,  S C S c s FreeTicket
i / .   Free tickets are distributed to mostly 
government officials to promote paying attendance.  State Theaters don’t advertise on TV and 
in  popular  newspapers.      Eq.(2)  is  also  estimated  by  a  TSLS,  taking  into  account  the 
possibility  of  endogeneity  of  number  of  performances.    One  period  lag  of  number  of 
performances is used as an instrument in the regression III in Table 1 and 2.  
The second equation to be estimated is a performance of play equation.  The objective 
function of government office is to find the optimum number of performances since every 
performance of particular play has an opportunity cost.  For a given budget, the government 
office is to optimize the number of performances.  Price is not in the objective function of 
government since price is exogenous and announced in the beginning of the season.  The 
government does not have the goal of revenue or profit maximization; therefore price is not 
included in the performance equation. The equation is as follows 
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Eq.(5) is estimated as a TSLS, with one period lag of paying attendance as an instrument for 
the paying attendance variable.  Results of TSLS of eq.(5) are given in regression IV in Table 
1 and 2.  All the variables except for dummy variables are in natural logarithm s. Therefore, 
estimated coefficients are related elasticity estimation.  
3.  Data and Estimation Results 
We utilize data for the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 seasons. 136 and 115 plays are 
performed in 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 seasons respectively.  The smallest aggregation unit 
is one month.  This means, for example, that we can see how many tickets were sold for a 
particular  play  in  a  given  month,  but  not  see  how  many  were  sold  for  each  individual 
performance.  Because performance data is aggregated at the monthly level, we treat each 
play performed in each month as a separate cross-sectional observation.  This leaves us with 
692 maximum observations for the 2003-2004 season and 558 maximum observations for 
2004-2005 season.  A panel of theaters over time would not be appropriate because we are 
interested in the various offerings of plays rather than following specific theaters over time.  
A panel of plays  over time would be inappropriate for several reasons including  lack of 
monthly variation in most variables, the extreme imbalance in the number of performance 
periods  for  different  plays,  and  the  evolutionary  nature  of  live  theater.    Some  plays  are 
performed more than others in a given month (though none were performed at more than one 
theater in a given month), and not every play is performed every month since there are more 
plays than theaters.   
  All data are calculated from raw data provided by the General Directorate of State 
Theaters.   Free passes are mostly given to government officials.  A high-level administrator 
in the State Theaters has informed us that free passes are given to government officials with 
the expectation that they will promote sales by bringing more paying customers.  It is useful 
to mention that the number of free passes per performance is higher than that of single tickets 
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per performance in all less developed cities with the exception of Trabzon ( Akdede and King, 
2006).   
 
 
Table 1. Attendance and Performance for 2003-2004 Season 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  AEI is suggested by a unanimous 
referee and calculated as follows: (Paid attendance/performance)/(Number of seats available net of free seats), 
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Touring  0.04 
(0.08) 
       
LDC*touring  0.36*** 
(0.10) 
  0.32*** 
(0.11) 























Total  Paid 
attendance 
        -0.18 
(0.18) 
Number  of 
observations 
692  422  503  365  396 
Adjusted R
2  0.54  0.61  0.62  0.56  0.12 
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Table 2. Attendance and Performance for 2004-2005 Season 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  AEI is suggested by a unanimous 
referee and calculated as follows: (Paid attendance/performance)/(Number of seats available net of free seats), 


































































































































Touring  -0.11 
(0.10) 































Total  Paid 
attendance 
        0.38* 
(0.21) 
Number  of 
observations 
558  349  511  317  396 
Adjusted R
2   0.60  0.63  0.66  0.29  0.01 
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 It is observed in Table 1 that the number of performances does not affect the total paid 
attendance  as  Regression  I-Regression  III  indicates.    In  Regression  III,  performance  is 
instrumented  taking  into  account  the  possibility  of  endogeneity.    One  period  lag  of 
performance  is  chosen  as  an  instrument  and  the  results  still  indicate  that  the  number  of 
performances  does  not  affect  the  total  paid  attendance.    Regression  II  indicates  that 
cumulative number of performances does not affect the total paid attendance either.  These 
results  can  be  interpreted  as  evidence  that  the  number  of  performances,  as  exogenous 
variables in the first three regressions in Table 1, does not affect the total paid attendance.  
This is taken as an indication of inefficiency in the state theaters since it is expected that the 
number of performances positively and significantly affect the total paid attendance. They 
should  not  wait  until  performances  become  insignificant  or  negatively  significant.    New 
season  plays  are  the  exception  of  this  judgment  since  new  season  plays  might  not  be 
performed  enough  number  of  times,  therefore  there  might  be  no  systematic  relationship 
between  attendance  and  number  of  performance  for  new  season  plays.    For  this  reason, 
regressions are controlled for the new season plays by including a dummy for new season 
plays.   
Endogeneity of the number of performances is also investigated.  Therefore, the total 
number of performance is modeled as a dependent variable in Regression IV.  Total paid 
attendance is one of the exogenous variables in this regression.  This is not implausible since 
state theaters can not control the total paid attendance directly even if they want to, whereas 
they  can  control  the  total  number  of  performances  directly  since  they  can  end  the 
performances of a play with an administrative decision.  Therefore, efficiency of state theaters 
can be judged by how optimum the number of performances is.  Results of this regression are 
given in Regressions IV.  Regression IV indicates that total paid attendance is not affecting 
the total number of performance.  This finding is not confirming the claims of the Chair of 
Dramaturgy Council.  New season plays are performed more, and cumulative performances 
positively affect the current period performances.    
Regression I differs from Regression II only in investigating the effects of cumulative 
performances  on  total  paid  attendance  in  Regression  II.    Touring  and  cumulative 
performances can not be in the same regressions since when plays tour in different towns, 
cumulative performance variable is irrelevant since those plays are not performed in those 
toured towns before.  For this reason, two separate regressions are run.  
  Regression  I-Regression  III  indicate  that  price  is  a  significant  variable  and  has 
expected sign.  Performance is either insignificant or negatively significant, indicating the 
possibility of inefficiencies in the state theaters in terms of number of performances.  It is 
either the fact that plays are performed too many times or that performance is not taken into 
account  in  understanding  what  determines  the  attendance.    Less  developed  cities  attract 
smaller number of paid attendance.  New season plays are attracting less number of people.  
This might be the fact that  
a.  New season plays are usually put on stage toward the end of the season 
b.  There is no advertising of plays in state theaters 
c.  People are so hesitant to see something unknown.  
Touring in less developed cities attract higher paid attendance per performance.  This is very 
intuitive since in those less developed cities, there are no cultural activities in most of the 
times.  These touring plays are cultural shocks to those towns and are performed only a few 
times in one or two days.  Therefore, people don’t want to miss the plays which are not easy 
to come across.  
  In terms of efficiency of state theaters, 2004-2005 season is better than the previous 
season since total paid attendance is significantly and positively affecting the total number of 
performances. However, if there are only two factors affecting the number of performances as 
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the head dramaturge of state theaters claims, then small R
2 is taken as a sign that the weight of 
audience interest is too small in determining the number of performances of the plays.     
4. Conclusion 
  This paper investigates the attendance and efficiency of state theaters in Turkey.  It is 
found that public theater attendance is price inelastic since theater expenses occupy a small 
space in theatergoers’ budget sets.  This is true since theater tickets are subsidized by almost 
97 percent ( Akdede and King, 2005)   
Touring to less developed cities attract more attendance per performance compared to 
changing the stages for a particular play on most developed cities.  This finding suggests that 
state  theaters  should  tour  to  different  less  developed  cities  more.    This  can  diminish  the 
criticism to state theaters also since popular press criticizes the state theaters in terms of 
producing many ATMactors.  
Results of 2003-2004 season indicate that performance is not a significant determinant 
of total paid attendance, whereas 2004-2005 season indicates that plays are performed too 
many times since performance is negatively and significantly affecting total paid attendance. 
Endogeneity of total number of performances and total paid attendance is taken into 
account and a 2SLS is run for both regressions.  Results are not changed in the sense that total 
number of performances is not significant, that is, total paid attendance is not affected by the 
total number of performances.  Therefore, some plays should have been off-staged before they 
run as long as they actually have.  
The claim of the Chair of Dramaturgy Council is also tested that audience interest is 
one of the determinants of total number of performance.  This claim is not confirmed by our 
results since attendance is not significantly affecting the total number of performances.  This 
is taken as a sign of inefficiencies in the State Theaters.  As a policy recommendation, more 
statistical analysis is necessary in terms of audience interest and attention to improve the 
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